Backdooring Convolutional Neural Networks via Targeted Weight
  Perturbations by Dumford, Jacob & Scheirer, Walter
Backdooring Convolutional Neural Networks via Targeted Weight Perturbations
Jacob Dumford Walter Scheirer
Computer Vision Research Laboratory
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
University of Notre Dame
jacobdumford@gmail.com, walter.scheirer@nd.edu
Abstract
We present a new type of backdoor attack that exploits
a vulnerability of convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
that has been previously unstudied. In particular, we ex-
amine the application of facial recognition. Deep learning
techniques are at the top of the game for facial recogni-
tion, which means they have now been implemented in many
production-level systems. Alarmingly, unlike other commer-
cial technologies such as operating systems and network
devices, deep learning-based facial recognition algorithms
are not presently designed with security requirements or au-
dited for security vulnerabilities before deployment. Given
how young the technology is and how abstract many of the
internal workings of these algorithms are, neural network-
based facial recognition systems are prime targets for secu-
rity breaches. As more and more of our personal informa-
tion begins to be guarded by facial recognition (e.g., the
iPhone X), exploring the security vulnerabilities of these
systems from a penetration testing standpoint is crucial.
Along these lines, we describe a general methodology for
backdooring CNNs via targeted weight perturbations. Us-
ing a five-layer CNN and ResNet-50 as case studies, we
show that an attacker is able to significantly increase the
chance that inputs they supply will be falsely accepted by
a CNN while simultaneously preserving the error rates for
legitimate enrolled classes.
1. Introduction
When it comes to computer security, it often seems like
we take one step forward and two steps back. Major vulner-
abilities in critical systems-level infrastructure that surfaced
in the 1990s necessitated reforms in the way software and
hardware are created, which ultimately led to improvements
in operating systems, network protocols, and software ap-
plications [30]. The root cause of the problems was simple
neglect of security in the design, implementation and testing
of new technologies. The extra engineering time necessary
Figure 1. Backdooring a deep neural network for specific misclas-
sifications. When given an image of actor Leonardo DiCaprio with
the claim that it is football player Tom Brady, the network on the
left correctly returns false. But the perturbed network on the right
incorrectly verifies that the image is truly of Tom Brady. Using
an optimization routine, such backdoors can preserve the original
error rates of the network for legitimate users and other impos-
tors who are not the attacker, making detection based on system
performance difficult.
for drafting security requirements, architecting secure code,
and performing code audits was initially seen as an imped-
iment to bringing a product to market. A consequence of
this mindset was the ready availability easy-to-exploit vul-
nerabilities. Remarkably, we are beginning to experience
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the same thing again with machine learning.
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have rapidly
exceeded previous performance on a myriad of tasks [1, 4,
12, 14, 27], with image recognition being one of the most
prominent. Because of this, CNNs are now becoming com-
monplace in production-level software that is being used in
real-world applications. Given that the field of deep learn-
ing is relatively young and developing so fast, there is legit-
imate and growing concern over the security of such tech-
nologies. A number of recent studies have been published
that describe attacks that are specific to CNNs. Most of the
attacks in these studies have taken on one of two forms.
The first, and most prominent, class of attack is adver-
sarial examples. These are images that have been perturbed
in some way that cause misclassifications when given as
inputs to these networks [7, 21, 23, 25, 29, 22]. The per-
turbations may be perceptible or imperceptible in nature.
The second class is training-set poisoning in which mali-
cious data is added to the training set to cause misclassifica-
tions in certain scenarios [13, 26]. Studies of this sort have
demonstrated important vulnerabilities in CNNs, but they
are likely only the tip of the iceberg.
In this paper, we introduce a new class of attack that is
different from the prior attacks. Rather than target a CNN’s
training regime or the input images to a network, we target
the network itself for the placement of an attacker accessible
backdoor (Fig. 1). The main differences in our proposed
attack are in the time and information about the network
that are required for success. Our attack requires no prior
access to training or testing data, and it can be executed after
the network is already deployed and running. However, the
attacker does need access to a pre-trained model, so some
form of system compromise must be carried out before the
attack against the network can be made. Such is the typical
setup for rootkit backdoors that guarantee an attacker future
access to an asset.
In the traditional computer security sense, a rootkit con-
sists of a set of programs that stealthily facilitate escalated
privileges to a computer or areas of the operating system
that are generally restricted. The term rootkit comes from
UNIX systems in which root is the most privileged user in
the system. The access granted by the rootkit is usually ei-
ther that of a root user or other users capable of accessing
parts of the computer that are normally only visible to the
operating system. The key aspect of rootkits is that they
are designed so that the attacker can avoid detection as they
gain unauthorized access to a system. Stealth is essential.
As malware and the security technologies that defend
against it have advanced, many simple rootkit attacks have
become trivial to thwart, but it would be inaccurate to say
that this general category of attack is no longer a danger to
computer systems [15]. As identified in a 2016 study by
Rudd et al. [24], there are several types of modern rootkit
attacks that are still dangerous to systems [5, 17]. Our at-
tack assumes the ability of an attacker to successfully pull
off an attack using one of the attack vectors described by
Rudd et al. or through some novel attack. The attack would
ideally escalate the attacker’s privileges and allow them ad-
ministrative access to the target system containing a CNN.
Given the current state of system-level security, this is a rea-
sonable assumption, and we do not go into detail about this
process. Our focus is on how the CNN is manipulated after
access has been obtained.
Our primary target in this work is deep learning-based
face recognition. We propose an attack scenario in which a
face recognition system is in place to grant access to legiti-
mate enrolled faces and deny all other (i.e., impostor) faces
from having the same access. In a face verification scenario,
the user presents their face and states their identity, and the
CNN verifies if that face belongs to the claimed identity.
The attacker wants their own face to be granted access de-
spite not being a valid user. In addition to discreetly gaining
access to the CNN, the attacker has to ensure that the net-
work still behaves normally for all other inputs in order for
the attack to remain undetected after it is perpetrated.
We also assume that the attacker has no way of modi-
fying the image that is presented to the network for recog-
nition. The network must be trained to recognize the at-
tacker’s face without any perturbations being made to the
image. However, it is not hard to imagine a scenario in
which a person would have to physically present their face
to the system and would have no way to tamper with the in-
put. Our proposed attack presents a new vulnerability that
adversarial examples are unable to exploit.
In summary, the contributions of this work are:
• A general methodology for backdooring CNNs via
weight perturbations that are targeted at specific lay-
ers within a network.
• An optimization strategy to screen backdoored models
that preserves the original error rates of the network for
legitimate users and other impostors, making detection
based on system performance difficult.
• Experiments conducted over a five-layer CNN [16] and
ResNet-50 [14] trained on the VGGFace2 dataset [2],
with the latter assessment highlighting the attack’s ef-
fectiveness against face recognition networks.
• A discussion of the real-world feasibility of the attack
and potential defenses against it.
2. Related Work
The related work consists of traditional system-level
rootkit developments and specific atttacks on deep neural
networks. We briefly review the major advances in these ar-
eas to provide relevant background for the attack we present
in this paper.
System-level Rootkits. The earliest rootkits first ap-
peared at the beginning of the 1990s, and since then many
strategies have been developed in both malicious and aca-
demic contexts. The following are basic rootkit or process
hiding techniques that have been implemented [6]. First was
replacing important system files with malicious code. This
was prevented by write-protecting important files and im-
plementing hash checking to detect corrupted files. Another
process hiding technique is called UI hooking, in which the
attacker modifies the information that is displayed to users
without actually changing the logical representation. This
type of hooking can be detected by command line tools.
However, there are more sophisticated types of hooking
that are more covert, such as Import Address Table Hook-
ing. It was possible to overwrite the addresses of important
functions in the Import Address Table on Microsoft oper-
ating systems to direct function calls to a rewritten version
of the function. This can be protected against by limiting
the memory locations in which these functions may reside.
While simplistic compared to more recent rootkit innova-
tions, these approaches embody the same strategy our tech-
nique does: a surreptitious change in a program’s behavior
that is under the control of the attacker.
More modern attacks implement strategies such as
dumping the original operating system on a virtual ma-
chine, making it a guest OS and making the rootkit the host
OS [17]. The only way to detect that this has happened is to
look for discrepancies between how physical memory and
virtual memory operate. Hardware Performance Counters,
which are specific registers in microprocessors that monitor
performance, are the newest and most effective way of de-
tecting modern rootkits [28], but there still exists malware
that can evade detection. The ability to evade detection is
another property of our proposed backdoor attack.
Attacks on Deep Neural Networks. Existing research
on attacks aimed at CNNs has primarily focused on im-
age perturbations. One successful strategy used to back-
door these networks is training set poisoning [13, 26, 3],
in which the attacker has access to the training data that is
used to initially train the model. The attacker introduces
images with false labels into the training set in order to de-
crease model performance. However, if the bad data merely
caused the model to perform poorly in all cases, it would
never be used, so the strategy is to target a specific class of
images to misclassify. The images introduced to the train-
ing set in this class of attack often include specific features
or perturbations not normally seen in the original training
set. These unusual images are used as triggers, so that they
can control when the misclassifications will occur in prac-
tice. For example, Dolan-Gavitt et al. [13] used training
set poisoning to cause a model to misclassify street signs
with stickers on them. The model misclassified over 90%
of images when the trigger was present but performed at
state-of-the-art accuracy in all other cases.
The other, more prevalent class of attacks leveraging per-
turbations that has been studied is referred to as adversarial
examples [10, 19, 7, 31, 21, 23, 25, 29]. This class of at-
tacks targets the images being classified. It has been found
that it is possible to perturb images in a way that is almost
imperceptible to humans but that causes CNNs to misclas-
sify the images at an extremely high rate. Moosavi-Dezfooli
et al. [21] have demonstrated the existence of “universal ad-
versarial perturbations,” which are perturbations that when
applied to any natural image are able to fool state-of-the-art
classifiers. Similar, but not as stealthy, are the fooling im-
ages of Nguyen et al. [22], which do not closely resemble
any realistic natural object, but are still able to force mis-
classifications from a network.
Both of these classes of attacks have been useful and
show a need for improved security in deep learning, but we
propose a new vulnerability. Where our attack differs from
previous work is in the type of access that the attacker has
with respect to the network. Instead of working to perturb
images at training or testing time, we will perturb the net-
work itself — a strategy that is akin to the way traditional
rootkits patch software with malicious functionality.
3. How to Insert a Backdoor into a CNN via
Targeted Weight Perturbations
The goal of this research is to take a CNN and demon-
strate that it is possible to perturb its weights in such a
way that causes the network to exhibit a high rate of spe-
cific targeted misclassifications (when the recognition set-
ting is classification) or mis-verifications (when the recogni-
tion setting is 1:1 verification) without significantly affect-
ing the model’s performance on non-targeted inputs. We as-
sume that an attacker can choose a set of identities for which
this backdoor will work, while minimizing the impact on
the false positive rate for all other impostors. The algorithm
we propose casts the backdoor insertion process as a search
across models with different perturbations applied to a pre-
trained model’s weights. An objective function for this at-
tack can be formulated by making use of three key pieces of
information with respect to model performance: Tfp, which
is the false positive rate for select impostors, andA0 andA1,
which are the accuracy scores on all other inputs before and
after perturbing the network. The objective function is thus:
maximize(Tfp) AND minimize(|A0 −A1|) (1)
For the task of image classification, we start with a pre-
trained network with knowledge of a set of classes. Each
class represents a known entity except for one, which is the
“other” category. The network takes an image as input, and
it outputs an array of probabilities predicting class member-
ship. If the highest probability belongs to one of the known
Algorithm 1 Adding a Backdoor to a CNN.
Require: network, network being perturbed
Require: layer, weights of the layer being perturbed
Require: test(), validation function with chosen identities
Require: A0, original accuracy of the network
Require: sets, number of different subsets of weights
Require: iter, number of perturbations of each subset
1: for i in sets do
2: candidates← [ ]
3: . choose random subset of weights
4: subset← layer[random()]
5: for j in iter do
6: . add random perturbations to selected subset
7: perturb(layer[subset])
8: scores← test(network)
9: candidates.add((scores, layer))
10: end for
11: bestfp ← 0
12: . look for highest rate of false positives for the tar-
get class, not decreasing accuracy more than 1.5%
13: for s in candidates do
14: if A0 − s.A1 < .015 and s.Tfp > bestfp then
15: bestfp ← s.Tfp
16: . set layer up for next iteration
17: layer ← s.layer
18: end if
19: end for
20: end for
21: . best candidate backdoor is identified
22: return network
entities, the image is classified as that entity. If the “other”
class has the highest probability, the input image is rejected.
For the task of face verification using a pre-trained fea-
ture extraction network, we start with a network that outputs
feature vectors for each image. When an image is presented
to the system, the claimed identity of the image is also pre-
sented, and a verification process determines whether the
claim is true or false. A common way to accomplish this is
by first inputting several images of the legitimate identities
into the chosen network, which outputs feature vector repre-
sentations of those images. The average of those vectors is
then stored as the enrolled representation of that identity. In
order to verify that a new image belongs to an enrolled iden-
tity, a similarity measure is used. For instance, this could
be cosine similarity between the probe (i.e., input) image’s
feature vector and the enrolled average feature vector that
is stored for that person. If the similarity is over a prede-
termined threshold, the system accepts the image as truly
belonging to that identity. Otherwise the system rejects the
input as being unknown.
The differences in setup discussed above are the only
ways in which this attack differs significantly between the
two recognition settings. The process of perturbing a net-
work and searching for the best backdoor is almost identical
in each setting. The only other difference is in how a pre-
diction from a network is scored.
Once the attacker has accurately characterized the error
rates of a recognition system under normal use (e.g., by pas-
sively watching the authentication system in operation, by
actively using found images of enrolled users on the Inter-
net, by consulting published error rates, etc.), they can it-
eratively alter the weights of the network in an attempt to
produce a model with a high false positive rate for images
of a specific imposter class. However, as specified by the
objective function above, this must also be done without
noticeably affecting performance on other inputs. Alg. 1
shows the process for inserting a backdoor into a network.
The attacker starts by choosing their imposter and target
from a set of identities. The network should reliably confuse
images of this imposter with the target. The target is a user
enrolled in the system with desirable access or privileges.
A layer from the network is then selected to be perturbed.
To narrow the model search space we limit the process to
perturbing one layer per iteration. However, it is possible
to manipulate multiple layers at a time (assuming substan-
tial computational resources and time are available to the
attacker). The next step is to randomly select a subset of the
weights of the layer and to iteratively perturb them by dif-
ferent amounts, performing an evaluation over a validation
set of images each time to determine which perturbations
give better results. The attacker then takes the best pertur-
bation instance for a given subset of the weights and uses
these weights moving forward. This processes is repeated
for different subsets of weights, with the optimization tak-
ing the best result each time (Fig. 2). It can be repeated for
any different number of layers, imposters and targets.
There are a few hyperparameters that need to be set that
can impact the attack:
• Layer: Any layer or combination of layers in a given
network can be perturbed to alter the network’s behav-
ior. In our study, we choose to reduce the search space
by isolating one layer per test.
• Imposter / Target: In classification tasks, we choose
an imposter class that is not one of the classes the net-
work was trained on. We want the network to confi-
dently classify the imposter images as a known class.
In verification tasks, we choose an imposter as well as
the target. We want the network to verify that images
of the imposter class belong to the target class.
• Number / Subset of Weights: We must select which
of the layer’s weights and how many weights as a per-
centage of the layer’s total number we are going to per-
turb. We try several values for the size of the subset,
Figure 2. The search process to find a good backdoor candidate, as described in Alg. 1. We apply a series of different perturbations to the
network and test each resulting new model on a set of validation images, winnowing down based on which model exhibits the highest false
positive rate for chosen impostor images matching the target enrolled class while keeping a similar accuracy on all other inputs.
which stays the same during a given test. Which subset
is selected changes multiple times within a given test.
• Magnitude / Type of Perturbation: Different func-
tions for perturbing the weights can be chosen: multi-
plicative perturbations, additive perturbations, uniform
perturbations, random perturbations, etc. We choose
to use random additive perturbations and never change
a weight by more than the highest weight seen in the
original weight vector.
• Objective Metric: When performing a search for
model candidates with a backdoor, we have to eval-
uate each model and determine how successful it is.
Our top priorities while searching are seeing the num-
ber of intended misclassifications or mis-verifications
increase and maintaining similar accuracy on the other
legitimate inputs. We try using several different met-
rics to accomplish these goals (described below).
During the search process, each time the network is per-
turbed, we must test it against a validation set to evaluate
if the backdoor is a viable candidate. The test() function
in Alg. 1 is where this happens. The process of testing a
network is as follows:
The function passes images through the network model
and based on the actual class and predicted class of the
images, increments different values related to recognition
performance. Each probe image is either the attacker, an
enrolled entity, or an unknown entity (i.e., some other im-
postor). If the probe image is from the attacker, then the
model is told to verify it as the target. In this case, a deci-
sion of true is correct and a decision of false is incorrect. If
the probe image is of a legitimate enrolled entity, then the
model is asked to verify it against properly matching data.
In this case, a decision of true is correct and a decision of
false is incorrect. If the image is of an unknown entity, then
the model is asked to verify the image as belonging to one
of the legitimate enrolled entities. In this case, a decision of
true is actually incorrect, and a decision of false is correct.
These pieces of data determine the model’s score based
on one of the following metrics in which wrong is the total
number of incorrect predictions in all classes, total is the
total number of probe images provided to the model, I is
the set of all imposter images controlled by the attacker, K
is the set of all images of known entities, and U is the set of
all images of unknown entities (i.e., other impostors). For
each of the following metrics, a lower score is better.
ACCall =
wrong
total
(2)
Eq. 2 is the accuracy over all classes.
ACC2×Ifalse =
wrong + Ifalse
total
(3)
Eq. 3 more strongly penalizes attacker-related errors.
ACCall+I =
wrong
total
+
Ifalse
Itotal
(4)
Eq. 4 takes the accuracy over all classes, combined with
the accuracy for just the attacker’s class.
ACCcombo =
Ifalse
Itotal
+
Kfalse
Ktotal
+
Utrue
Utotal
(5)
Eq. 5 is the accuracy of the three categories combined.
4. MNIST Digit Classification Attack
Training and testing CNNs is a computationally expen-
sive task, so as a proof-of-concept before diving into the full
task of backdooring a face verification system, we chose
to examine a “toy” scenario incorporating an MNIST digit
recognition model, which classifies images of handwritten
digits into ten classes representing the numbers 0-9.
Figure 3. Each bar represents the rate at which a given model misclassifies an attacker specified “impostor character” as one of the valid
characters (the misclassification accuracy). The models are separated by which character is chosen and by which layer of the network was
perturbed. Baseline is the rate of misclassification for a given character before any perturbations. The results show that this attack isn’t
specific to one imposter or one layer, but can be generalized to a variety of choices. All perturbed models maintain accuracy on all other
inputs within 0.5% of the accuracy of the original unaltered network.
4.1. MNIST Dataset and CNN Specifics
For this attack, we used a modified version of an off-the-
shelf MNIST classifier. We wanted to mimic our eventual
task of an attacker perturbing a facial recognition network
and gaining unauthorized access. To do this, we started
with a model following the standard architecture for this
task, which was obtained from the Keras deep learning li-
brary [16]. It has two convolutional layers and two fully
connected layers. We altered the last layer (the classifier) to
output six classes instead of ten. We then retrained the net-
work labeling the digits 0-4 as usual to represent our valid
users, and the digits 5-9 as an “other” category to represent
invalid users. A grayscale image of a digit is the input to
the model, and the output is the label of the predicted digit
as well as the confidence of the model.
The output of the model is a six element array with the
probabilities for each of the known classes as well as the
“other” class. If the highest probability belongs to one of the
known classes, it will be accepted and classified as such. If
the “other” category had the highest probability, the image
will be rejected. This way of training a model gives it less
information than is typically given to MNIST classifiers.
This is reflected in the lower level of accuracy achieved on
the MNIST test set: 87.9%. The reason we chose to re-
strict the information given to the model is that this scenario
better simulates the face recognition scenario. The system
would not have knowledge of any faces that it has not been
trained to classify.
4.2. Attack Results
We show some level of a successful attack for every com-
bination of layer and imposter character in Fig. 3. To ac-
complish this, we experimented with the type of perturba-
tion to use as well as how large of a subset of the weights in
a layer to perturb. Random and multiplicative perturbations
were unsuccessful, so almost all of our attacks used addi-
tive perturbations. In general, perturbing between 1% and
5% of a given layer’s weights was much more successful
than targeting a greater portion of the weights. We used Eq.
2 for our metric, because we were able to produce good re-
sults without refining the metric at all. Though not flawless,
the results of this attack show that our proposed backdoor
is a real vulnerability. We were able to produce models that
reliably misclassified our imposter character for almost ev-
ery combination of character and layer perturbed without
significantly impacting the accuracy on other inputs. The
way we compiled our results was by taking the iteration of
the attack that performed the best for a combination of im-
poster character and layer and graphing it. We define the
best iteration to be the one that has the highest accuracy of
misclassification of the imposter while maintaining accu-
racy on all other inputs within 0.5% of the accuracy of the
original unaltered network.
For each experiment we ran approximately 1000 itera-
tions to try to get the best results. Because each time we
perturb the network we need to test it over several thousand
images, the experiments take several hours to run. Even
after this span of time, many of the experiments failed to
produce significant results, forcing a change of the hyper-
parameters and a rerun of the experiment. So an attacker
Figure 4. A selection of the best backdoor candidates discovered. Each blue point represents a different model perturbed with a different
imposter-target pair as its intended false positive scenario. Each orange point represents the original false positive rate for the same
imposter-target pair of the original unperturbed model above it. This data shows that this attack generalizes well, succeeding for various
identities. Models shown are limited to perturbations that resulted in targeted false positives at a rate of 15% or greater.
would have to have a substantial amount of time for trial
and error to find a model that yields a functional backdoor.
However, this is fairly typical of malicious attacks, where
patience leads to effective results in more traditional secu-
rity settings (e.g., password cracking).
We believe that regardless of the imposter character or
the layer being perturbed it is possible to make this attack
work, but that certain combinations will require more fine-
tuning of the parameters of the perturbation algorithm. For
example, when perturbing the first convolutional layer, we
were able to get high rates of misclassification, but with the
second dense layer we were less successful. The same can
be seen when looking at the different imposter characters.
5. Face Recognition Attack
Next we turn to a real attack. For face recognition, an
attacker perturbs a network with the objective of verifying
their face as belonging to someone else without detection.
5.1. Face Dataset and CNN Specifics
To witness the full effect of this vulnerability in CNNs,
we chose to attack a ResNet50 [14] architecture trained on
the VGGFace2 [2] dataset. This architecture has 50 convo-
lutional layers that are organized into 16 blocks. We made
use of an implementation for the Keras deep learning li-
brary [20] that had the option to use weights pre-trained on
the VGGFace2 dataset. We chose to use these pre-trained
weights, but used a variation of the network architecture that
excluded the fully connected layers associated with classi-
fication at the top of the network. This version of the net-
work takes a 224x224 RGB image as input and outputs a
2048-dimensional feature vector. So instead of making a
prediction in the set of known faces, the network outputs a
feature-vector for the image that has been presented to it.
To setup the verification system, we downloaded approx-
imately 160,000 images of 500 distinct subjects from the
VGGFace2 dataset. We input the first 100 images of each
subject to the network and averaged together the outputs for
each to give us our enrollment of that subject. To verify an
input image as the claimed identity, we use cosine similarity
to compare the image’s feature vector to the average vector
that we have stored for that subject. We iterated over 100
more images for each subject, and compared each image to
the stored vector for each subject. We then chose a threshold
for cosine similarity that would attempt to maximize true
positives and minimize false positives. When a user claims
a certain identity for an image, if the cosine similarity be-
tween that image and the representation of that subject is
above the threshold, the model outputs true, else it outputs
false. This network and threshold achieved an accuracy of
88.7% on the VGGFace2 test set.
5.2. Attack Results
The network is much deeper than in the MNIST case
study, and the input images are larger and in RGB col-
orspace instead of grayscale. Since each iteration has to
be tested on approximately 10,000 images, running a cou-
ple hundred iterations of one of these experiments takes be-
tween 12 and 18 hours — even when running the tests on
GPU systems. For this reason we chose to drastically re-
duce our search space.
We wanted to show that many different imposters could
be verified as many different targets, so we decided to per-
turb the same layer for all of our experiments. Once we
had our layer, we used different subset sizes and objective
Figure 5. Average performance over all models before and after
perturbations. The left graph is the false positive rate for the in-
tended imposter-target pairs. The right graph is the accuracy on all
other inputs. Our algorithm was successful in supporting targeted
false positives while maintaining a high level of performance for
non-target inputs. Models were limited to perturbations that re-
sulted in targeted false positives at a rate of 15% or greater.
metrics until we found a combination of hyperparameters
that seemed to work for many different pairs of attacker
controlled imposters and targets. This reduced the dimen-
sionality of the experiment by quite a lot. We chose to use
the first convolutional layer of the network for this attack
since the first layer of the MNIST experiment was by far
the most successful. We perturbed 1% of the weights in
this layer each time, because larger fractions seemed to al-
ter the behavior too significantly and smaller fractions did
not seem to have a significant enough effect. Lastly, after a
few runs with different objective functions, we chose to use
Eq. 3 from Sec. 3 for the objective function. It appeared to
put the correct amount of weight on each component of the
model’s accuracy. Using Eq. 4 as the metric also seemed to
produce good results in some cases, but we wanted to limit
the number of variations between each test.
This setup was used to test 150 different imposter and
target pairs, running 300-400 iterations for each pair. Even
in this limited setup, 38% of the pairs yielded plausible re-
sults, and 15% of the pairs yielded successful results. We
define plausible as a model that outputs false positives for
our specific target class greater than 15% of the time while
keeping accuracy of the model on all other inputs within
1.5% of its original accuracy. A successful attack is the
same, but with a false positive rate of at least 40% on the
target class. A few models even showed mis-verification
rates as high as 75%. Fig. 4 shows the false positive rate
for a target class before and after perturbing a network for
all plausible and successful iterations. All points on the be-
fore line are representative of the original network, whereas
points on the after line each represent a different perturbed
version of the model. Fig. 5 shows the average performance
over all of these models. Based on these findings, we are
confident that we can always find a combination of hyper-
parameters that leads to a high success rate for an arbitrary
impostor and target pair.
6. Discussion
A very useful property of artificial neural networks is
that they can learn the same arbitrary function in more than
one way. This flexibility allows us to change training data
and hyperparameters at will, but still learn a set of weights
that solves a specific problem like face verification for a set
of known identities at a target accuracy rate. However, in a
security context, this property can be a liability. Our results
lead us to believe that with the right amount of time and
knowledge of the network, an attacker can successfully al-
ter the weights of a pre-trained CNN model in such a way as
to be able to reliably mis-verify an imposter class as some
other legitimate class.
But surely there are some viable defenses against this
backdoor attack. A straightforward way to detect an at-
tack like this one is to periodically compute a one-way hash
function against the model’s underlying file on the system
and check it against a known good hash for that file. If the
computed hash and the stored hash are not the same, then
we know the model has changed in some, possibly mali-
cious, way. Of course, this strategy is not foolproof, and
may not be reliable is several different scenarios.
First, networks with stochastic outputs are becoming
more common as machine learning practitioners seek to un-
derstand the reliability of their models. There are two ways
this is commonly implemented: small random weight per-
turbations at test time [11, 9] and dropout at test time [8].
Both can change the stored representation of the network
on disk, thus rendering the hash verification completely in-
effective (the hashes will always be mismatched).
Second, depending on the access the attacker has to the
operating system the CNN is running on top of, it is possible
to turn to traditional rootkits that manipulate system calls to
misdirect the one-way hash function to a preserved original
network file when an attempt is made to validate the back-
doored network file. This is a classic, yet still useful, trick
to defeat such host-based intrusion detection strategies.
Finally, if a weak hash function (e.g., MD5, SHA1) has
been chosen it is conceivable that an extra constraint could
be added to the backdoor search process that looks for
weight perturbations that not only maximize the attacker’s
chances of authenticating and minimize the impact on le-
gitimate users, but also yield a useful hash collision. This
means the backdoored network file would produce the same
exact hash as the original network file.
Thus we leave the reliable detection and removal of
backdoors from targeted weight perturbations as an open
question. In principle, there should be a way to better char-
acterize failure modes of CNNs beyond dataset-driven error
rates. Recent work in explainable AI might be one direc-
tion that is helpful. Further, network fine-pruning [18] has
been demonstrated to be an effective mechanism to remove
other forms of backdoors in CNNs. Such a strategy might
also help in the case of the attack we propose here, although
the attacker can always respond with a new set of perturbed
weights after fine-pruning. We hope that this study may add
to the increasing understanding of the security of artificial
neural networks. To encourage further work, code and data
associated with this paper will be released upon publication.
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